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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Coal is the dominant source of electric power in the United States, 
providing nearly 50 percent of all electricity in the country.1  In 
comparison, the other major sources of electricity – natural gas and nuclear 
power – supply only about 20 percent each of the country’s electricity, and 
renewable energy sources account for less than 10 percent.2  Until recently, 
it appeared that coal would retain its superior position over these other 
electricity sources, despite decades of environmental regulation aimed at 
controlling the environmental harm caused by coal mining and combustion, 
because coal remained the cheapest source of electricity.3  However, the 
specter of climate change legislation may threaten coal’s supremacy.  Coal-
powered electricity is the largest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.  The author thanks Kristen 
Monsell (J.D. 2009) and Oday Salim (LL.M. 2009) for their excellent research assistance, 
and the students of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for hosting an 
excellent symposium and working with me on this piece. 
 1. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2008 228 fig.8.2a (2009), 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. (showing coal use in electricity increasing consistently since 1949, while 
natural gas and nuclear energy have seen small spikes in production that have ultimately 
plateaued).  See also John A. Sautter, Note, The Clean Development Mechanism in China: 
Assessing the Tension Between Development and Curbing Anthropogenic Climate Change, 
27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2009) (explaining that coal is cheap because it is abundant).  
Many federal environmental laws regulate aspects of coal mining and combustion, including 
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006), the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1387 (2006), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 
1201-1328 (2006). However, many commentators have argued that agencies do not 
adequately apply these laws to coal.  See, e.g., Reid Mullen, Note, Statutory Complexity 
Disguises Agency Capture in Citizens Coal Council v. EPA, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 927 (2007) 
(discussing inadequate regulation under the Clean Water Act); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
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in the United States,4 and coal has therefore become a primary target of 
climate change legislation pending before Congress.5  As regulators 
evaluate the potential costs of climate change regulation, they have begun 
to reject coal as a cheap electricity source.6  If more regulators follow suit, 
the energy system in the United States could profoundly change. 
 Traditional utility regulation has favored coal to provide abundant, 
reliable, and above all, cheap electricity to utility consumers.7  Under 
traditional utility regulation regimes, electric utilities receive permission to 
operate as natural monopolies and, in exchange, they agree to provide 
service to all customers within their service area and to earn revenues set 
by public utility commissions (PUCs) under cost-of-service ratemaking 
proceedings.8  Traditional cost-of-service ratemaking aims to achieve two 
ostensibly competing goals.9  Ratemaking must provide the utility an 
adequate rate of return that will enable it to retain its investors and attract 
new ones, and ratemaking attempts to protect consumers from exploitative 
rates.10 For decades, PUCs have embraced coal as an ideal electricity 
source that enables PUCs to accomplish their paradoxical regulatory 
objectives, because coal is both profitable for the industry and cheap for 
consumers.11 
 Until very recently, it appeared that PUCs would continue to favor 
coal as the ideal source of abundant, reliable, and cheap power.12  However, 
in a handful of decisions issued since 2007, PUCs have rejected or 
restricted utilities’ proposals to construct new coal-fired power plants.13  In 
some cases, the PUCs referenced potential climate change legislation or 
carbon costs as the justification for their decisions, noting that project costs 
 
 4. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND 
SINKS: 1990-2007 Annex I at A-4 tbl.A-1 (2009), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads09/Annex1.pdf. 
 5. See American Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(amending current regulatory policies to establish a combined efficiency and renewable 
electricity standard that requires utilities to supply an increasing percentage of their demand 
from energy efficiency savings and renewable energy and setting forth performance 
standards for new coal-fired power plants). 
 6. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text. 
 7. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 73 (3d 
ed. 2004) (noting producers reliant on fossil fuel are favored because they can realize 
economies of scale). 
 8. Id. at 122-24. 
 9. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 93 (2d ed. 2006). 
 10. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring). 
 11. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7 at 223 (noting coal’s abundance). 
 12. See id. at 254 (predicting coal would maintain or increase its importance in the U.S. 
energy portfolio). 
 13. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text. 
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associated with climate change would make coal unduly expensive and 
risky.14  Regulators have also resisted proposals for new “clean coal” plants 
because the technology remains unproven and costs of “clean coal” could 
be enormous.15  In these decisions, PUCs have no longer embraced coal as 
an unambiguously reliable or cheap source of power. 
 The history of the nuclear power industry during the 1970s and 
1980s sheds light on the regulators’ cautious approach to new coal plant 
proposals.  During the 1950s and 1960s, PUCs approved construction of 
dozens of nuclear power plants in the United States.16  By the 1970s, 
however, the nuclear industry imploded when electricity-use projections 
proved wrong, plant construction costs skyrocketed, and the reactor at 
Three Mile Island had a near-meltdown.17  As desire and demand for 
nuclear power dissipated, utilities stopped building nuclear plants and 
declined to bring completed plants into operation.18  When the utilities 
sought to recover their costs from electricity ratepayers, PUCs faced hard 
decisions and unhappy stakeholders.  PUCs could pass on the costs to 
ratepayers who never received any electricity; they could force the utilities’ 
investors to bear the costs of plants even though the PUCs had authorized 
their construction; or PUCs could attempt to fairly allocate the costs 
between ratepayers and utilities.19  No matter what choice they made, PUCs 
could not reach a politically satisfactory result.  Regulators’ reluctance to 
allow new coal plants likely reflects their desire to avoid repeating the 
mistakes made with nuclear plants. 
 The recent PUC decisions rejecting new coal plants reflect concerns 
that future climate change legislation may drive up the costs of coal to the 
point that it no longer represents a viable source of affordable energy.  Cost 
estimates of the climate change bill recently passed by the House of 
Representatives20 predict that coal will lose its dominance over time as 
climate change controls become more stringent.21  Even if Congress does 
not enact climate change legislation in the near term, the uncertainty 
associated with prospective regulation will likely alter regulators’ views of 
coal.  Having been burned during the ascendancy of the nuclear industry, 
PUCs will proceed with particular caution before approving new facilities 
 
 14. See infra notes 135-169 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 170-196 and accompanying text. 
 16. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1. 
 17. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text. 
 20. American Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 21. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 
2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 26 (2009) [hereinafter 
ENERGY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454] (projecting coal production and 
consumption will decrease dramatically by 2030 under ACESA cap-and-trade program). 
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that could be subject to carbon regulation.  The threat of any law is enough 
to keep PUCs cautious and to alter the dynamics in the electricity sector. 
 Regulators’ skepticism regarding the future of coal could help 
transform the nation’s energy system whether or not Congress passes an 
aggressive climate change bill.  In the short term, utilities will likely turn to 
natural gas.22  Over time, however, utilities will need to transition to other 
energy sources to avoid price volatility.23  Although some scholars predict 
that “clean coal” and nuclear energy will replace existing coal plants if 
Congress passes climate change legislation,24 the recent coal plant denials 
may signal a broader reluctance by PUCs to expose ratepayers to the 
financial risks “clean coal” and nuclear facilities present.  Regulators’ 
current doubts about coal may therefore prompt near-term investment in 
renewable energy technologies and a longer-term switch away from coal, 
natural gas, and even nuclear power.  Under this alternative scenario, 
traditional utility regulation, which typically eschews innovation and 
uncertainty, may prove to be an important tool in making renewable energy 
sources economically viable. 
 Part II of this article provides an overview of traditional utility 
regulation and explains why traditional ratemaking has favored coal.  Part 
III describes the failure of the nuclear industry during the 1970s and 1980s 
and explains how PUCs allocated the costs between ratepayers and utilities 
for electricity they never received.  Part IV explains why coal plants face 
particular risks in a carbon-constrained world, introduces different coal 
combustion technologies, and explains how these technologies present both 
opportunities and limitations for the coal industry.  Part V then describes 
how PUCs have restricted or rejected utilities’ proposals to construct new 
coal-fired power plants in an effort to protect ratepayers from avoidable 
cost risks.  Part VI concludes that the specter of climate change regulation 
will irrevocably change PUCs’ attitudes toward coal.  This, in turn, has the 
potential to create more opportunities for renewable energy technologies 
and to fundamentally alter the electricity system of the United States. 
 
 22. JOHN D. PODESTA & TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NATURAL GAS:  
A BRIDGE FUEL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2009), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/pdf/naturalgasmemo.pdf (describing the 
benefits of and opportunities for natural gas use). 
 23. Natural gas prices, like oil prices, also may be subject to unpredictable price swings.  
See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 
799 (2008) (“Natural gas prices are notoriously volatile, complicating the projection of 
revenues for sellers on energy markets.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from 
Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 211 (2009) (proposing legal strategies to promote 
“clean coal”); Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 1, 13-14 (2007) (outlining the greater profitability of nuclear power plants in 
comparison to natural-gas-fired plants). 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL UTILITY REGULATION 
 Shortly after Thomas Edison established the first central power 
station in Manhattan in 1882, the electricity system in the United States 
became dominated by vertically integrated investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs).25  Vertically integrated utilities own and operate all three 
components of the electricity system:  generation of the electricity at power 
plants, transmission of the electricity over high-voltage power lines, and 
distribution of the electricity to end-users.26  For most of the 20th century, 
vertically integrated utilities dominated the electricity sector, and even 
today, despite the increase in independent power producers that generate 
electricity to sell to utilities,27 vertically integrated IOUs continue to 
produce nearly 40 percent of all electricity delivered in the United States.28 
 Vertical integration of electric utilities prompted regulators to treat 
the electricity system as a natural monopoly.29  Under a typical 
monopolistic system, a monopoly will initially lower its prices to drive out 
competitors.30  Once all competitors have exited the market, the monopoly 
will have unlimited power to increase prices and lower production to 
maximize its profit.31  To prevent monopolistic behavior, regulators have 
several possible responses.32  Most commonly, regulators will use antitrust 
laws to “break up” the monopoly and restrict the monopoly’s behavior to 
promote competition.33  However, in some circumstances, regulators will 
determine that a particular industry will never be competitive and that 
monopolies within that industry are inevitable.34  Where regulators 
determine such natural monopolies exist, they will increase regulation over 
 
 25. Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 503-506 (2005). 
 26. See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring:  Theory vs. Practice, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 419 (2005) (describing vertical integration of utilities). 
 27. See id. at 424-25 (discussing increasing acceptance of competitive wholesale 
market for electricity). 
 28. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Industry Generating Capacity by Type, 2007, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/figure3.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2009). 
 29. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 506-07 (defining natural monopoly and 
describing legal precedent that led to recognition of natural monopolies and subsequent 
regulation). 
 30. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A 
NUTSHELL 39-40 (4th ed. 1999). 
 31. Id. at 40 (“[T]he monopolist will maximize profits by restricting output and setting 
price above marginal cost.”). 
 32. Id. at 47-48. 
 33. See id. at 48 (“If a firm does become a monopolist, it can be divided into several 
smaller firms in order to restore a competitive market.”). 
 34. Id. at 48-53. 
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the monopoly’s behavior and its prices.35 
 Regulators considered the electricity system a natural monopoly 
because the high costs associated with construction of power plants and 
transmission and distribution lines made it economically infeasible for 
competitors to enter a market where infrastructure already existed.36  
Moreover, additional power lines were considered unnecessary; once a 
utility had installed its power system, there would be no need for 
additional, redundant power lines.37  Therefore, regulators thought it 
unlikely that competition in the electricity sector would ever develop.38  
Although many have challenged whether electricity remains a natural 
monopoly,39 most regulators continue to view the electricity system as a 
monopoly requiring comprehensive regulation.40 
 To prevent abuses from a monopolistic electricity utility, a state 
PUC will enter into a regulatory compact with the utility.41  Under this 
compact, the utility receives a franchise to provide exclusive service within 
a particular geographic area.42 In exchange, the utility must provide service 
to all customers within the region and it must agree to cost-of-service 
ratemaking regulation by the PUC.43  Through cost-of-service ratemaking, 
the PUC allows the utility to earn “just and reasonable” revenues while 
 
 35. Id. at 53-54. 
 36. Id. at 506-508.  The electricity system in the United States initially consisted of 
dozens of small power stations and hundreds of self-contained power generators located 
within various cities.  See HOWARD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY (1991) as reprinted in 
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 737-43 (describing that when Samuel Insull, a protégé 
of Thomas Edison, developed a centralized electricity and transmission system that was able 
to produce and transmit electricity over long distances, he became able to out-compete the 
smaller, less efficient, localized plants, and once a larger centralized system became 
established, economies of scale prohibited other electric companies from establishing their 
own competitive systems). 
 37. Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 506. 
 38. See id. at 506-07 (noting the connection between natural monopoly and need for 
government regulation). 
 39. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 30, at 51 (“As a result of this combination of 
changes in technology and costs, electricity generation is no longer a natural monopoly.”). 
 40. See Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 507 (“[A] proposed price regulation must 
first show that the industry exhibits monopolistic tendencies and second that the industry is 
affected with a public interest.  Electricity clearly satisfies both tests . . . .”). 
 41. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring), footnoted in Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 
507, n.50.  States have jurisdiction over all “retail” electricity sales, while the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has power under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 791a-828c (2006), over all interstate wholesale sales of electricity and interstate 
transmission.  16 U.S.C. § 824b(1) (2006).  Wholesale electricity sales are sales of 
electricity to any entity that will then sell the electricity at resale to an end-user.  16 U.S.C. § 
824d (2006). 
 42. Shapiro & Tomain, supra note 25, at 507. 
 43. Id. at 507-08. 
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protecting customers from exploitative rates.44  In essence, the overarching 
goal for a PUC is to ensure the utility will provide cheap, abundant, and 
reliable electricity for ratepayers.  As explained below, traditional utility 
regulation has encouraged utilities to meet these goals by building large 
coal-fired power plants. 
A.  Traditional Utility Regulation Favors Large Capital Projects 
 Historically, traditional utility regulation has incentivized the 
construction of capital-intensive power plants and infrastructure.  The 
“duty to serve” requires utilities to provide electricity to all customers 
within the geographic area of the utilities’ franchises.45  This duty means 
that utilities must build infrastructure to supply power to customers located 
within and beyond city and commercial centers.46  When communities 
expand beyond urban boundaries, utilities must expand infrastructure to 
provide electrical service.47  As energy demand grows within utilities’ 
service areas, utilities must obtain more power to serve their customers.48  
This typically means that utilities will build new power plants to respond to 
increased energy demand by businesses and residential consumers.49  
Although utilities may meet this demand by purchasing power from 
independent power producers, traditional regulation incentivizes 
construction of new power plants by the utilities.50 
 Traditional ratemaking practices employ a common formula51 to 
calculate utilities’ revenues, and this formula creates economic incentives 
for utilities to build infrastructure and power plants.52  Under this formula, 
utilities may recover from ratepayers their operating expenses – which 
include expenditures for labor costs, fuel costs, administrative costs, and 
the like – and earn a profit (called a rate of return) on their capital 
 
 44. Jersey Cent. Power, 810 F.2d at 1172.  See also id. at 1192 (Starr, J., concurring) 
(“FERC has already moved somewhat in the direction of balancing competing interests by 
permitting recovery of the costs of building the plant in the cost of service.”). 
 45. Spence, supra note 26, at 419-20. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in 
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1251-57 
(1998) (discussing the obligation to extend services over time). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 1278-79 (discussing the rise of independent power producers as electricity 
suppliers). 
 51. R = Br+O, where R = the utility’s revenue requirement, B = the rate base, r = the 
rate of return, and O = operating expenses.  TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130. 
 52. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1059 (1962) (applying the formula to a hypothetical 
situation to demonstrate how firms operate in certain markets). 
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expenditures (called the rate base) – which include expenses associated 
with building new power plants, transmission lines, and other facilities.53  
Under this formula, utilities will earn a greater profit if their rate bases – 
i.e., their capital expenses – increase.54  The ratemaking formula, therefore, 
incentivizes the construction of new power plants because capital projects 
provide utilities with a relatively secure way of increasing their rate base.55 
B.  Traditional Regulation Favors Coal 
 While it is clear that traditional utility regulation favors capital 
construction, it is not necessarily clear that it would favor coal over other 
sources of power.  Nonetheless, traditional utility regulation has 
particularly favored the use of coal and incentivized the construction of 
coal power plants since World War II.56  Several aspects of traditional 
utility regulation have contributed to coal’s dominance.  As noted above, 
utilities must demonstrate their capital expenditures will provide cheap, 
abundant, and reliable electricity.57  Reliable baseload58 electricity 
traditionally has come from coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy.59  Of 
these sources, only coal has thus far avoided significant economic or 
ecological constraints.  As a result, coal has remained the dominant source 
of U.S. electricity.60 
 Natural gas currently accounts for a little more than 20 percent of 
U.S. electricity production,61 and it has never come close to competing with 
 
 53. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130-31, 36 (noting that in order to stay 
functional, firms must recoup operating expenses). 
 54. See Richard J. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:  
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 500-01 (1984) (explaining 
how electricity demand forecasts in the early 1970s spurred increased construction of new 
plants). 
 55. See id. at 542-43 (discussing incentive effect of various rate treatment schemes).  
See also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 130-31 (discussing controversial nature of rate 
base determinations). 
 56. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a (demonstrating the increase 
of the net generation of coal since 1950). 
 57. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 
1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (noting rates must be “just and reasonable” to 
consumers). 
 58. Energy Info. Admin., Glossary: B, http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_b.htm 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (defining “base load” as “[t]he minimum amount of electric 
power delivered or required over a given period of time at a steady rate.”). 
 59. See id. (defining a base load plant as one “usually housing high-efficiency steam-
electric units, which is normally operated to take all or part of the minimum load of a 
system, and which consequently produces electricity at an essentially constant rate and runs 
continuously.”).  Coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants fall within this definition. 
 60. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a (comparing the net 
generation by all sectors). 
 61. Id. 
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coal as a base load source of electricity.62  From the 1930s until the early 
1980s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its 
predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, regulated natural gas as a 
natural monopoly, similar to the way most PUCs regulate electricity now.63  
However, unlike the electricity system, the natural gas system always 
featured many independent natural gas producers and a competitive 
intrastate market.64  FERC’s regulation did not fit with the realities of the 
natural gas market, and it both stifled natural gas production and kept 
prices artificially high.65  This period coincided with the development of 
many of the existing coal-fired power plants in the United States, and high 
gas prices prevented natural gas from becoming a financially reliable 
source of energy during the 1960s and 1970s.66  Deregulation of the natural 
gas market in the 1980s spurred many utilities and, more importantly, 
independent power producers to build several more natural gas plants.67  
Despite this, natural gas has not become competitive with coal because 
natural gas prices track oil prices and are therefore subject to the price 
shocks common in the oil industry.68  While some energy experts believe 
natural gas could become a more dominant fuel if the United States passes 
climate change legislation,69 it has not yet proven competitive with coal. 
 Nuclear power seemed likely to displace coal as the dominant 
source of electricity in the late 1950s and 1960s, when utilities built dozens 
of nuclear power plants based on the promise that nuclear power would be 
“‘too cheap to meter.’”70  As a result of that construction boom, nuclear 
power currently accounts for 20 percent of U.S. electricity production.71  
But the costs associated with constructing nuclear power plants were never 
 
 62. See id. at 231 tbl.8.2b (showing that every year since 1949, coal has generated 
significantly more electricity than natural gas). 
 63. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1995, at 53-55 (describing the history and problems of 
natural gas regulation). 
 64. See id. at 54 (stating that the production of gas is “not a natural monopoly”). 
 65. Id. at 55. 
 66. See id. at 54 (acknowledging that by the mid 1970s, “gas service was no longer 
available to most prospective new customers”). 
 67. See id. at 84 (stating that “gas is being found, produced, stored, and transported at a 
much lower cost than was [previously] the case”). 
 68. Bosselman, supra note 24, at 13-14. 
 69. See PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22 and accompanying text (stating that “natural 
gas can serve as a bridge fuel to a low-carbon, sustainable energy future”).  But see 
Bosselman, supra note 24, at 11-13 (arguing that natural gas may not remain an abundant 
source of energy in the near future and that industry experts expect to increase imports of 
natural gas as production from domestic gas wells declines). 
 70. See Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 227-
28 (2005) (discussing aggressive construction of nuclear power plants during this period). 
 71. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 228 fig.8.2a. 
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competitive with coal,72 and the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island 
effectively ensured that no more nuclear plants would come online to 
compete with coal during coal’s ascendancy.73  Although some 
commentators believe that climate change legislation could revive the 
nuclear industry as a source of carbon-free electricity,74 others question 
whether nuclear energy will ever become economically competitive or 
publicly accepted.75  To date, though, nuclear energy production has 
remained a weak competitor, and coal has retained its primacy in the 
electricity sector. 
Climate change, however, threatens coal’s dominance in the electricity 
sector.  Although concerns about the direct impacts of coal production and 
combustion have never threatened coal’s status before, the projected costs 
of carbon have led regulators to reject or restrict new coal plants.76  As the 
next section explains, the PUCs may be attempting to prevent a repeat of 
the fiascos associated with the build-up and rapid demise of the nuclear 
industry. 
III. PAYING THE COSTS FOR UNUSED NUCLEAR PLANTS 
 The rise and fall of the nuclear energy industry include several 
interesting parallels to the current situation of the coal-based electricity 
sector.  Although nuclear energy never gained the market share that coal-
based energy currently enjoys, its boom and bust has served as a cautionary 
tale for utilities and their regulators.  This is not only due to public fears 
 
 72. See Tomain, supra note 70, at 229 (noting that the market for nuclear power would 
not have been able to operate without government support). 
 73. See id. at 225 (noting that all plants ordered since 1973 have been canceled and that 
no nuclear power plants have come online since 1978). 
 74. See Bosselman, supra note 24, at 37-52 (discussing relative environmental 
advantages of nuclear power).  In August 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
stated that it planned to process twenty-three applications to license and build new nuclear 
power plants “over the next several years.”  U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 2009-
2010 INFORMATION DIGEST 43 (2009), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/v21/sr1350v21.pdf.  At least one commentator views these 
new license applications, and the several pending requests for license renewals for existing 
nuclear plants, as an indication that the United States is “in the midst of the ‘Second 
Coming’ of nuclear power.”  Anthony Z. Roisman et al., Regulating Nuclear Power in the 
New Millennium (The Role of the Public), 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 317, 317 (2009).  
Despite this pronouncement, Roisman and his co-authors view the NRC’s public 
participation processes as inadequate and do not believe nuclear power will play an 
increased role in providing electricity until the NRC improves the licensing processes.  Id. at 
363. 
 75. See Tomain, supra note 70, at 232-46 (noting that prospect of a nuclear-powered 
future will depend on public acceptance and relative cost). 
 76. See infra notes 135-196 and accompanying text. 
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regarding the safety of nuclear power plants.77  Rather, the economic costs 
associated with nuclear plants which never came online have forced 
utilities and PUCs to act with great caution in the face of uncertainty. 
A. Nuclear Power’s Rise and Fall 
 Nuclear energy in the United States got its start with the passage of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 194678 and the creation of the Atomic Energy 
Commission.79  Under the 1946 Act, however, only the military could 
develop or use nuclear energy, because Congress then believed that nuclear 
energy required strict controls.80  By 1954, moods about nuclear power had 
changed, and the nuclear power industry successfully lobbied for the 
passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.81  The new Atomic Energy Act 
encouraged private ownership and commercial development of nuclear 
power plants.82  The passage of the Price-Anderson Act of 195783 further 
promoted private development of nuclear energy by limiting the liability of 
utilities and nuclear reactor manufacturers should a nuclear accident 
occur.84  These two laws quickly spurred a boom in nuclear power plant 
construction.  In total, between 1955 and 1979, the Atomic Energy 
Commission issued construction permits to build 177 nuclear generating 
units.85  As a result of this boom, nuclear energy accounted for 
approximately twenty percent of the nation’s electricity production in 
2008.86 
 However, the boom quickly ended with the accident at Three Mile 
Island in 1979, when a nuclear plant’s core reactor malfunctioned and 
nearly experienced a complete meltdown.87  That year marked the last one 
in which the Atomic Energy Commission or its successor, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, issued a construction permit for a nuclear 
facility.88  The accident also exacerbated other problems in the nuclear 
power industry.  Several plants had incurred cost overruns in which 
 
 77. See infra notes 87 and 91 (discussing the Three Mile Island accident). 
 78. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946). 
 79. Tomain, supra note 70, at 226. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954). 
 82. Tomain, supra note 70, at 227. 
 83. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)). 
 84. Tomain, supra note 70, at 227. 
 85. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1. 
 86. Id. at 276 tbl.9.2. 
 87. See Barry Kellman, Anxiety Over the TMI Accident:  An Essay on NEPA's Limits of 
Inquiry, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 219, 227-32 (1983) (describing the details of the Three 
Mile Island accident). 
 88. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 1, at 275 tbl.9.1. 
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construction costs increased two-, three-, and even fivefold over initial cost 
estimates.89  In addition, energy forecasts from the 1950s and 1960s proved 
inaccurate, and it became clear that utilities no longer needed electricity 
from the nuclear plants.90  Ultimately, revised cost estimates and concerns 
about plant safety arising from the Three Mile Island accident led to dozens 
of plant cancellations and abandonments.91  In some cases, planned 
facilities never reached the construction phase; but in others, fully 
constructed plants never went online.92  Yet all of the canceled plants 
involved significant expenditures of money,93 and the question quickly 
turned to who should pay for the costs associated with these useless 
facilities. 
B. Who Pays?:  Prudent Investment v. Used and Useful 
 PUCs typically approached the question of who should pay for 
canceled plants by employing the “prudent investment” doctrine, the “used 
and useful” doctrine,94 or a combination of the two.95  The prudent 
investment doctrine allowed a utility to include the costs of a plant in its 
rate base so long as the utility’s investment in the plant was prudent at the 
time of the decision to invest.96  As noted above, the inclusion of the plant 
in the utility’s rate base meant that the utility would earn a rate of return, or 
profit, on the plant.97  The used and useful doctrine allowed a utility to 
include a plant in its rate base if the plant was “actually used and useful to 
the utility in providing regulated services.”98  The hybrid approach, which 
most PUCs applied to nuclear plants, allowed a utility to recover the costs 
of the plant but typically prohibited the utility from including the costs in 
its rate base.99 
 As the number of canceled nuclear plants grew, some legislatures 
passed laws prohibiting utilities from recovering any of their investment in 
 
 89. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 7, at 324. 
 90. Pierce, supra note 54, at 498-99. 
 91. See id. at 498-99 (noting that, in 1984, more than one hundred nuclear plants had 
been canceled, many of which would have provided “totally superfluous generating 
capacity”). 
 92. Id. at 497-98. 
 93. See id. at 498-99 (noting that plant cancelations had already resulted in a loss of ten 
billion dollars, and they were expected to yield losses of many more billions). 
 94. Id. at 511. 
 95. Id. at 517. 
 96. Id. at 511. 
 97. Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.  See also Pierce, supra note 54, at 511-
12 (showing how the inclusion of a new plant to the ratemaking formula significantly 
impacts the rates of return). 
 98. Pierce, supra note 54, at 512. 
 99. Id. at 518-19. 
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the canceled plants from ratepayers.100  In Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Barasch,101 the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania law declaring “‘the 
cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility 
producing . . . electricity shall not be made a part of the rate base nor 
otherwise included in the rates charged by the electric utility until such 
time as the facility is used and useful in service to the public.’”102  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted this law to prohibit utilities 
from recovering any of the costs of the plants in either their rate bases or 
through amortization.103  On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the 
utilities’ arguments that the Pennsylvania law resulted in an 
unconstitutional taking of the utilities’ property.104  The Court declared the 
Pennsylvania law, and others like it, beyond the federal courts’ scope of 
review unless utilities could demonstrate that the laws would, by 
themselves, bankrupt the utilities.105  As a result of Duquesne, PUCs 
retained great authority to decide how to allocate costs for failed 
investments in nuclear plants. 
C.  The Broader Consequences of Allocating Costs for Failed Facilities 
 In the end, none of the practices employed by PUCs yielded 
immediately satisfactory results.  Politically, PUCs were in a no-win 
situation because any decision allocating the costs inevitably resulted in 
either the utilities or the ratepayers, or both parties, feeling cheated.  
Beyond that, as Professor Pierce has explained, each cost allocation 
decision necessarily affected the utilities’ future business plans.  PUCs that 
allowed utilities to include the full costs of the failed plants in their rate 
bases penalized ratepayers and signaled to utilities that they could expect to 
earn a profit on investment decisions that turned out to be imprudent.106  
PUCs that prohibited utilities from recovering from the ratepayers any 
investment in the canceled plants sent mixed messages to utilities and 
ratepayers.  On the one hand, the denial of any recovery incentivized 
utilities to under-invest in new power plants so they could avoid exposure 
to failed investments at the outset.107  On the other hand, a utility already in 
the process of construction would likely continue the project, even if the 
 
 100. Id. at 519-20. 
 101. 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
 102. Id. at 304 (quoting 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1988)) (omission in original). 
 103. Id. at 305. 
 104. Id. at 310-16. 
 105. Id.  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court applied longstanding precedent 
which empowers federal courts to review only the “end result” of a PUC’s ratemaking 
decision.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
 106. Pierce, supra note 54, at 542. 
 107. Id. at 542-43. 
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electricity was no longer required, to avoid the harsh treatment some states 
afforded plants that did not go into service.108  While the hybrid approach 
some PUCs employed may have mitigated the most extreme consequences 
of a strict prudent investment or used and useful test,109 it nonetheless left 
utilities, regulators, and ratepayers dissatisfied to some degree. 
 Beyond that, the rise and fall of the nuclear industry appears to have 
had lingering consequences as PUCs struggle to predict how potential 
climate change regulation will affect utilities’ investments in new coal 
plants.  As the next section explains, several utilities have attempted to 
invest in new coal-burning technologies that would reduce, and perhaps 
eliminate, carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants.  Yet, as 
Part V shows, PUCs appear unwilling to expose ratepayers to the risk that 
these technologies, which are expensive and in some cases unproven, will 
fail to adequately reduce emissions to the levels Congress may ultimately 
demand.  Thus, the lasting legacy of the nuclear plant cancellations may 
ultimately signal the end of coal’s dominance in the electric sector. 
IV. COAL, CARBON DIOXIDE, AND DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGIES 
 In 2007, coal-fired power plants accounted for eighty-two percent of 
all carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector110 and over twenty-
seven percent of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.111  Not 
surprisingly, these emission levels have made coal-based electricity a 
primary target of enacted and proposed laws aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions.112  In response, the coal industry has attempted to develop 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 543-44.  Professor Pierce argues that a policy allowing for recovery of out-of-
pocket costs of an investment in a canceled plant, exclusion of some cost of capital 
associated with the failed plant, and a penalty to discourage over-investment could create 
the right incentives for future plant investment decisions.  Id. at 543.  Even so, he 
acknowledges that the specific formula to achieve the right incentives is difficult to establish 
or employ.  Id. 
 110. Carbon dioxide emissions from stationary power plants that burn fossil fuels for 
electricity equaled 2,397.2 teragrams of carbon dioxide equivalents (Tg CO2 Eq.).  ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 4, at 3-8, tbl.3-9.  Coal-fired power plants accounted for 1,967.6 
Tg CO2 Eq., or slightly more than 82 percent, of the total carbon dioxide emissions from the 
electricity sector.  Id. 
 111. Total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions equaled 7,150.1 Tg CO2 Eq.  Id. at 2-1.  Coal-
fired power plants emitted 1,967.6 Tg CO2 Eq., or 27.5 percent of total greenhouse gas 
emissions, in carbon dioxide alone.  Id. at 2-18, tbl.2-13.  Although coal plants emit other 
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide emissions dwarf all other greenhouse gas releases.  Id. at 
2-7 to 2-8, tbl.2-4 (stationary combustion of fossil fuels emits only 6.6 Tg CO2 Eq. of 
methane and 14.7 Tg CO2 Eq. of nitrous oxide). 
 112. See, e.g., REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
(2005), http://rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf (establishing a regional cap-and-trade 
program for carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation); REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS 
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new coal combustion technologies that reduce carbon dioxide emissions or 
capture and permanently store carbon dioxide emissions.  The obvious 
objective of these technologies is to enable the coal industry to maintain its 
prominence in the electricity sector.  However, the industry’s ability to do 
this will depend largely on the willingness of PUCs to allow utilities to 
invest in new coal technologies while the scope of climate change 
regulation remains unclear. 
 Typical coal-fired power plants use a standard technology to convert 
coal into electricity:  they burn coal to create steam, which then drives a 
turbine to create electricity.113  Most technological advances in coal-based 
electricity have focused on increasing efficiency to burn less coal and thus 
emit fewer pollutants.114  For example, early “sub-critical” coal-fired power 
plants burned coal to boil water to create the steam.115  Other early 
innovations, employing “supercritical” technologies, focused on ways to 
increase pressures and temperatures so that more steam could form using 
less coal.116  Most existing coal plants use these standard technologies, but 
even those that employ “supercritical” coal combustion continue to emit 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide each year.117 
 As concerns about climate change have increased, electric 
companies have worked to develop new coal combustion technologies to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions.  The two primary technologies, “ultra-
supercritical” technology and integrated gasification combined-cycle 
technology, seek to increase the efficiency of coal combustion.118  Coal 
plants currently operate at about thirty-five percent efficiency, with the 
remaining energy released as waste heat.119  American Electric Power has 
 
INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE (2008), 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf; H.R. 2454, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (proposing a federal cap-and-trade program); Act of Sept. 29, 2006, 2006 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 598 (establishing a statewide emissions performance standard requiring all 
long-term power purchases to come from plants that emit no more than a combined-cycle 
gas turbine power plant and thus prohibiting long-term power contracts for coal-powered 
electricity). 
 113. William L. Sigmon, The Lure of Ultra-Supercritical:  Exploring the Future of Coal-
Burning, ENERGYBIZ, Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 90, 90, available at 
http://energycentral.fileburst.com/EnergyBizOnline/2008-5-sep-oct/Tech_Frontier_Ultra-
Supercritical.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 90-91. 
 117. See id. at 91 (noting that many new coal plants coming online will use supercritical 
technology); DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM 
THE GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 3 tbl.2 (2000), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/co2_report/co2emiss.pdf (noting that coal 
plants emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999). 
 118. Sigmon, supra note 113, at 90. 
 119. See VELLA A. KUUSKRAA, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, A PROGRAM TO 
POWERSFINALIZED_THREE 3/31/2010  2:03:02 AM 
422 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
developed an ultra-supercritical technology that will use increased 
pressures and temperatures to create steam, and theoretically increase the 
efficiency by about eleven percent.120  Other companies have invested in 
integrated gasification combined-cycle (IGCC) technologies, which first 
convert coal into a synthetic gas that is then burned in a combustion 
cycle.121  The waste heat from the combustion cycle then heats water to 
create steam, which then powers a steam-generated turbine.122  This 
combined combustion/steam system has the potential to operate up to 
twenty percent more efficiently than traditional coal plants.123  Even with 
these efficiency gains, however, coal-based electricity will still account for 
millions of tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year.124 
 A more aggressive technology under development would employ 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology to capture carbon 
dioxide emissions from coal plants, pump the carbon dioxide into 
underground storage areas, and sequester the carbon dioxide indefinitely.125  
Although CCS could theoretically apply to subcritical and supercritical coal 
plants, the costs to adapt the plants for CCS would likely be prohibitively 
expensive.126  Technologically and economically, it should be easier to 
integrate CCS technology into IGCC plants, although the carbon capture 
 
ACCELERATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE (CCS):  RATIONALE, 
OBJECTIVES, AND COSTS 9 tbl.2 (2007), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/CCS-
Deployment.pdf (noting that plant efficiencies vary depending upon when the plants came 
online).  Plants built before 1970 have an average efficiency of twenty-eight percent; those 
built between 1970 and 1989 have a thirty-six percent efficiency rate, and those built 
between 1990 and 2003 achieve thirty-nine percent efficiency.  Id. 
 120. Sigmon, supra note 113, at 91. 
 121. DEP’T OF ENERGY, HOW COAL GASIFICATION POWER PLANTS WORK, 
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/gasification/howgasificationworks.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See David Biello, How Fast Can Carbon Capture and Storage Fix Climate 
Change?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Apr. 10, 2009, 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-fast-can-carbon-capture-and-
storage-fix-climate-change (noting that a single coal-fired power plant using IGCC 
technology in West Virginia will emit 8.5 million metric tons of CO2). 
 125. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION, 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
 126. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, COST AND PERFORMANCE BASELINE 
FOR FOSSIL ENERGY PLANTS 11 (2007), http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-
analyses/pubs/Bituminous%20Baseline_Final%20Report.pdf [hereinafter NETL COST AND 
PERFORMANCE].  See also NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP’T OF ENERGY, WHAT ARE THE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION?, 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/FAQs/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 2, 
2009) [hereinafter NETL COST AND BENEFITS] (explaining results of cost estimates and 
demonstrating that CCS applied to pulverized coal plants using sub- and supercritical 
technology would increase costs by 70 to 100 percent). 
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and sequestration process would use about one-fourth of all electricity 
generated from the plant.127  However, the development of commercial-
scale power plants with CCS technology is in its infancy and has proceeded 
to date in fits and starts due to cost concerns and technological 
challenges.128  Most notably, the Department of Energy briefly canceled 
funding for the FutureGen project, a proposed commercial-scale ICGG 
power plant with CCS capacity, when it realized the plant would cost $1.8 
billion, about $850 million more than it had anticipated.129  Although the 
Department later renewed its support for the FutureGen facility, many other 
private investors backed out of the facility’s development due to concerns 
about the stability of the project’s funding.130  Other commercial-scale CCS 
plants have yet to proceed as far as FutureGen.131  Thus, while ICGG plants 
with CCS may provide a way to continue to use coal in a carbon-
constrained world, the deployment of the technology appears to be distant. 
 The electricity sector thus faces a conundrum as it attempts to 
respond to climate change.  It emits a significant amount of greenhouse 
gases, primarily from coal-based power, and existing technologies allow 
coal plants to operate more efficiently but do not significantly reduce 
overall carbon dioxide emissions.  More innovative technologies will 
consume about one-quarter of any new plant’s energy and may cost about 
$2 billion to deploy.132  Although technologies may become cheaper over 
time, coal’s dominance as a “cheap” form of energy may be nearing an end.  
At least, it seems that PUCs believe this to be the case.  As discussed in the 
next section, this belief may in fact make coal’s potential demise a 
certainty. 
 
 127. NETL COST AND BENEFITS, supra note 126; Trish Choate, Sweetwater Coal Plant 
Ready for Cap and Trade Rules, SAN ANGELO STANDARD TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009 (noting that 
proposed CCS facility would use about twenty-five percent of power plant’s electricity), 
available at http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/mar/30/sweetwater-coal-plant-ready-
for-cap-and-trade/. 
 128. See Matthew L. Wald, Refitted to Bury Emissions, Plant Draws Attention, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A1 (discussing the difficulties with implementing CCS 
technologies). 
 129. Martin LaMonica, DOE Scraps FutureGen “Clean Coal” Project for New Tack, 
CNET NEWS, Jan. 30, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-9861473-54.html. 
 130. Sonal Patel, Revived FutureGen Faces Renewed Funding Obstacles, POWER, Aug. 
1, 2009, http://www.powermag.com/coal/Revived-FutureGen-Faces-Renewed-Funding-
Obstacles_2077.html. 
 131. See Wald, supra note 128 (discussing other efforts to develop CCS facilities). 
 132. See Choate, supra note 127 (discussing the energy used to capture and compress 
carbon dioxide at a proposed plant); LaMonica, supra note 129 (discussing the $1.8 billion 
estimated cost of a proposed FutureGen project). 
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V. APPLYING TRADITIONAL ELECTRICITY REGULATION TO NEW COAL 
PLANTS IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 Although traditional electricity regulation has favored the use of 
coal thus far, the costs associated with climate change, combined with the 
electricity sector’s experiences with nuclear energy, make it likely that coal 
will lose its dominance within the electricity sector.  Even if Congress fails 
to pass climate change legislation within the immediate future, or enacts a 
mediocre law that requires very few reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions in the short-term, the specter of climate change legislation will 
likely be enough to discourage construction of new coal plants.  A handful 
of PUCs across the country have already rejected proposals for new coal 
plants because they expect climate change legislation will impose 
significant carbon costs on utilities and their ratepayers.133  Other PUCs 
have rejected coal plants proposing to use innovative technology, like 
IGCC and carbon capture and sequestration, due to concerns regarding the 
expense and uncertainty involved in deploying new technologies.134  
Combined, these cases reveal an increasing wariness on the part of PUCs to 
allow construction of new coal plants. 
A. The PacifiCorp Projects 
 Oregon was perhaps the first state to reject a utility’s proposal to 
build new coal plants due, in part, to concerns about pending climate 
legislation.135  In Oregon, utilities must prepare integrated resource plans 
(IRPs), which serve as long-range planning documents.136  IRPs identify 
existing energy resources and propose an overall resource portfolio 
designed to achieve low costs and limit ratepayers’ risks.137  Once a utility 
 
 133. See infra notes 135-169 and accompanying text; see also Robert L. Glicksman, 
Coal-Fired Power Plants, Greenhouse Gases, and State Statutory Substantial 
Endangerment Provisions:  Climate Change Comes to Kansas, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 
538-52 (2008) (discussing various state denials of proposed new coal plants). 
 134. See infra notes 170-196 and accompanying text; see also Glicksman, supra note 
133, at 546-47 (discussing North Carolina’s “go-slow” approach regarding IGCC 
technology). 
 135. See In re PacifiCorp, 2007 WL 299389 (Or. P.U.C. Jan. 16, 2007) (denying 
approval of PacifiCorp’s draft RFP). 
 136. In re Integrated Resource Planning, 255 P.U.R.4th 367, 385 (Or. P.U.C. Jan. 8, 
2007); see also Sandra L. Hirotsu, Remembering the Bottom Line:  Why the Oregon Public 
Utility Commission’s Obligation to Protect Utility Ratepayers Requires Saying No to Coal 
14-15 (Apr. 24, 2008) (unpublished comment, on file with the author) (describing the IRP 
process). 
 137. In re Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n., 2007 WL 534555 (Or. P.U.C. Feb. 9, 2007) 
(describing the rule for investigations into Integrated Resource Planning); Hirotsu, supra 
note 136, at 14. 
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develops an IRP, it must then present the IRP to the Oregon PUC for 
“acknowledgement.”138  If the PUC acknowledges a utility’s plan to build 
new electricity generation plants, this acknowledgement provides support 
for a utility when it seeks to include the costs of the plant in its rate base.139  
In contrast, if a PUC denies all or part of an IRP, the utility will have a 
more difficult time receiving authorization to build a power plant or 
recover the costs of the plant in its rate base.140 
 PacifiCorp is a utility regulated by the Oregon PUC.  In 2004, the 
Oregon PUC acknowledged in part an IRP prepared by PacifiCorp; 
however, the Oregon PUC declined to acknowledge PacifiCorp’s stated 
need for two large power plants for the eastern side of its service area.141  In 
its denial, the Oregon PUC concluded that PacifiCorp had failed to 
demonstrate an adequate need for the additional power plants and advised 
PacifiCorp to “delay a commitment to coal until IGCC technology is 
further commercialized.”142  Rather than wait, PacifiCorp filed an updated 
IRP claiming a need for one base load power plant.143  Before the Oregon 
PUC had the opportunity to review or acknowledge the updated IRP, 
PacifiCorp submitted a draft “Request for Proposals,” seeking authorization 
to solicit bids to construct new coal power plants.144 
 In 2007, the Oregon PUC rejected PacifiCorp’s request.  First, the 
PUC held that PacifiCorp had not demonstrated a need for two large power 
plants.145  Second, to the extent PacifiCorp had demonstrated some need for 
additional electricity, it had shown a need for peaking power.146  The 
Oregon PUC found large base load plants inappropriate to fill peak power 
demand, particularly since large plants could limit the utility’s ability to 
respond to “uncertainties related to technology change and regulation of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.”147  Third, the PUC concluded that 
PacifiCorp’s construction of large coal-fired power plants would likely 
expose the utility to significant cost risks due to recent greenhouse gas 
emissions legislation passed by California.148  California had established an 
emissions performance standard prohibiting utilities in California from 
entering into long-term contracts to purchase power from any power plants 
 
 138. Integrated Resource Planning, 255 P.U.R.4th at 370; Hirotsu, supra note 136, at 14-
15. 
 139. Hirotsu, supra note 136, at 15. 
 140. Id. 
 141. PacifiCorp, 2007 WL 299389, at *3. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at *1. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *5. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at *6-7. 
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whose greenhouse gas emissions rates exceeded the emissions rates of a 
combined-cycle gas turbine power plant (i.e., a natural gas plant).149  
PacifiCorp’s proposed coal-fired power plants would not have met the 
California standards, and, therefore, the Oregon PUC considered 
PacifiCorp’s intention to sell electricity to California unduly risky.150  In 
short, based on the uncertain prospects of future climate change legislation 
and the certain risks associated with California’s emissions performance 
standards, the Oregon PUC rejected PacifiCorp’s proposal to build new 
coal plants. 
 The Oregon PUC also discussed, but did not decide, how PacifiCorp 
should factor the costs of climate change into its proposal.151  PacifiCorp 
had estimated that carbon costs would add eight dollars per ton of CO2 to 
its projected costs, while other parties argued the costs should range from 
$8.50 per ton to $30.80 per ton.152  Based on the potential costs, the Oregon 
Department of Energy concluded that PacifiCorp should be allowed to 
build only IGCC plants with carbon sequestration, if it were to build any 
coal plants at all.153  Although the Oregon PUC did not adopt the 
Department of Energy’s recommendation, it made it clear that carbon 
dioxide costs would become a significant factor in future decisions. 
B. The Turk Plant 
 In 2007, Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) filed 
an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN)154 with 
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Texas PUC) to build a 600-
Megawatt ultra-supercritical coal-fired power plant.155  Although the Texas 
PUC found that SWEPCO demonstrated a need for the plant,156 it 
 
 149. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8340 (2008). 
 150. In re PacifiCorp, 2009 WL 299389 at *7 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2007). 
 151. Id. at *9-10. 
 152. Id. at *9. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Most states require utilities to obtain pre-approval to construct new plants from 
PUCs.  The approval is often issued as a certificate of convenience and necessity (CCN), 
which certifies that the plant is necessary to meet projected power needs and in the public 
interest.  BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 62. 
 155. Order Conditionally Approving Application of Sw. Elec. Power Co. for a Coal 
Fired Power Plant in Ark. at 10 ¶ 1, PUC Docket No. 33891, SOAH Docket No. 473-07-
1929, (Tex. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 12, 2008) [hereinafter SWEPCO]. 
 156. Id. at 3-4.  The administrative law judge (ALJ) initially recommended denial of the 
CCN because he did not believe SWEPCO had adequately demonstrated a need for 
additional electricity to serve its ratepayers.  Id. at 2. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that 
SWEPCO had improperly included wholesale power – power SWEPCO would generate and 
then sell to a non-regulated entity for resale – in its forecasts of energy needs.  Id.  The ALJ 
believed SWEPCO could only consider the needs of its regulated customers when 
forecasting future energy requirements.  Id.  The Texas PUC, however, held that SWEPCO 
POWERSFINALIZED_THREE 3/31/2010  2:03:02 AM 
2010] THE END OF COAL AS “CHEAP” ELECTRICITY 427 
 
nonetheless restricted SWEPCO’s ability to recover future carbon 
mitigation costs from ratepayers.157  The Texas PUC noted that estimated 
costs for CO2 emissions could range from $13 per ton to $70 per ton, and 
average CO2 costs would range between $30 to $45 per ton, depending 
upon the number of allowances available during the early phase of any cap-
and-trade program and the availability of carbon capture and sequestration 
in the future.158  After recognizing the significant degree of uncertainty 
regarding the potential costs, the Texas PUC limited SWEPCO’s ability to 
pass carbon mitigation costs onto consumers by declaring that any 
mitigation costs that exceed $28 per ton through the year 2030 “shall not be 
borne by Texas ratepayers.”159 
 Although the Texas PUC’s decision represents a moderate response 
to uncertainty regarding carbon regulation, it nonetheless signals an 
important shift within PUCs regarding climate change.  The Texas PUC 
recognized the likelihood of future carbon regulation and sought to protect 
ratepayers from exposure to future costs.  In so doing, the Texas PUC put 
the utility and its investors on notice that they would bear responsibility for 
unanticipated costs.  At the same time, the decision raises several important 
questions, including who will pay carbon mitigation costs after the year 
2030.  This lingering uncertainty regarding future carbon costs may require 
utilities to proceed with even greater caution as they decide whether to 
invest in new coal plants. 
C. The WP&L Plants 
 The Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (Wisconsin PSC) is 
perhaps the first PUC that based its denial of a CCN squarely on costs 
associated with carbon mitigation.  Wisconsin Power and Light Company 
(WP&L) sought a CCN authorizing construction of a 300-Megawatt power 
plant using coal as its primary fuel.160  WP&L presented the Wisconsin 
PSC with two options, both of which would employ traditional coal-
burning technology to produce electricity.161  WP&L’s initial cost estimates 
for the projects ranged from $777 million to $795 million.162  Within nine 
 
could include wholesale power sales in its needs forecast.  Id. 
 157. Id. at 8. 
 158. Id.  It is unclear what timeframe applies to these estimates.  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Final Decision Denying Application of Wis. Power and Light Co., d/b/a Alliant 
Energy, for Auth. to Construct a New Coal-Fired Plant in Wis., No. 6680-CE-170 (Wis. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter WP&L]. 
 161. Id. at 1.  One plant would employ a “circulating fluidized bed boiler” that could 
burn coal, pet coke, and biomass, while the other would use a subcritical pulverized coal 
boiler to burn coal and up to four percent biomass.  Id. at 1-2. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
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months, WP&L’s cost projections had climbed to between $1.26 billion 
and $1.283 billion, representing a 62 percent increase over the initial cost 
estimates.163  Based on the revised figures, the Wisconsin PSC determined 
that the WP&L plant, if built, would be “the most expensive conventional 
coal plant of its size . . . ever proposed in the United States.”164  With this 
statistic in mind, it is not surprising that the Wisconsin PSC denied 
WP&L’s requested CCN.  However, the Wisconsin PSC’s cost analysis did 
represent a significant change in its historical approach to calculating 
electricity costs. 
 The Wisconsin PSC’s cost determinations hinged on its inclusion of 
greenhouse gas mitigation expenses in the plant’s cost estimates.165  WP&L 
had argued that the PSC could not include greenhouse gas emissions in its 
consideration of the application for the CCN because a state statute 
prohibited the PSC from considering “the impact of air pollution” in 
deciding whether a proposed facility will meet the public interest 
requirement for a CCN.166  The PSC, however, concluded that it could 
consider monetization of greenhouse gases in its cost assessment of the 
proposed plant.167  The Wisconsin PSC then determined that, if greenhouse 
gas monetization were factored into the plant’s cost, the expenses would 
increase between $551 million and $817 million.168  Based on these 
anticipated costs, which would have made the plant “the most expensive 
conventional coal plant of its size,” the Wisconsin PSC found the projects 
contrary to the public interest.169 
 The Wisconsin PSC also briefly entertained WP&L’s suggestions 
that it could increase the value of the plants by retrofitting them for future 
carbon capture and sequestration technology.170  The PSC found the 
technology for carbon capture and sequestration “so experimental and so 
far from commercial viability” that it refused to consider the proposed plant 
modifications as money-saving measures.171  Indeed, the PSC speculated 
that carbon capture and sequestration would probably increase the costs of 
the plants significantly.172 
 The Wisconsin decision may signal a new wariness on behalf of 
PUCs regarding the traditional claim that coal-fired power plants can 
deliver cheap power.  Although the Wisconsin PSC recognized that the 
 
 163. Id. at 2-3. 
 164. Id. at 3. 
 165. Id. at 7-9. 
 166. Id. at 9 (citing Wis. Stat. § 196.491(3)(d)3 (2002)). 
 167. Id. at 9-10. 
 168. Id. at 7-8. 
 169. Id. at 3, 13. 
 170. Id. at 11. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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utility needed to add base load power to its energy generating resources,173 
it refused to allow coal plants to fulfill this need.  And it based its refusal 
almost entirely on the added costs that carbon regulation will impose on 
power plants.  As discussed in greater detail below, this case could 
represent a new future for energy policy as PUCs attempt to protect 
ratepayers from exposure to uncontrolled costs that climate change 
legislation may impose. 
D. The Mesaba Project 
 While the other PUC decisions demonstrate regulators’ increasing 
reluctance to allow new coal plants to go online due to projected carbon 
costs, a Minnesota PUC decision reveals a reluctance to expose ratepayers 
to uncertain costs of carbon mitigation technologies.  In 2005, Excelsior 
Energy, Inc. (Excelsior) sought preliminary approval to begin construction 
of an IGCC coal plant, known as the Mesaba Project, in Minnesota.174  The 
Minnesota legislature had passed a law in 2003 that provided several 
incentives for construction of IGCC facilities in the state, including 
exemptions from parts of the state PUC approval process for new power 
plants.175  One of the most important incentives would guarantee that the 
regulated utility in Minnesota, Xcel Energy, would enter into a long-term 
power purchase agreement (PPA) committing to buy 450 Megawatts of 
power from the Excelsior site.176  However, Excelsior required the 
Minnesota PUC’s approval of the PPA and other preliminary authorizations 
before it could begin constructing the facility.177  The Minnesota PUC 
refused to give Excelsior the authorizations it needed because the Excelsior 
plan would have exposed ratepayers to unacceptable risks. 
 Before seeking the Minnesota PUC’s approval, Excelsior attempted 
to negotiate a mutually agreeable PPA with Xcel.178  When these 
negotiations failed, Excelsior filed a petition with the Minnesota PUC, 
asking it to approve, amend, or modify its proposed PPA and to order Xcel 
to buy 13 percent of its retail energy from Excelsior’s Mesaba Project.179  
 
 173. Id. at 4-5. 
 174. Order Disapproving Petition by Excelsior Energy, Inc., for Approval of a Power 
Purchase Agreement under Minn. Stat. § 216B.1694, Docket No. E.-6472/M-05-1993 at 3-4 
(Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Excelsior]. 
 175. Id. at 1-2. 
 176. Id. at 1. 
 177. Id. at 1-2.  Among the other requirements, Excelsior required a finding from the 
Minnesota PUC that the IGCC was a “least cost resource” under state law and sought an 
order directing Xcel to buy 13 percent of the power it needed for its retail customers from 
Excelsior.  Id. at 4. 
 178. Id. at 4. 
 179. Id. 
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Administrative law judges (ALJs) assigned to review the petition 
concluded that the costs in the PPA were unreasonable.180  Moreover, the 
ALJs concluded that the actual costs of the Mesaba Project were so high 
that it was unlikely Excelsior could develop any PPA with reasonable 
prices.181  Excelsior appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Minnesota PUC. 
 After acknowledging that both state and federal lawmakers “clearly 
consider IGCC technology – and this project – sufficiently promising,” the 
Minnesota PUC rejected Excelsior’s requests for approval of the power 
purchase agreement because it found the terms of the proposed PPA would 
be contrary to the public interest and would expose Xcel Energy and its 
ratepayers to unreasonably high rates and risks.182  The Minnesota PUC 
explained that it would review the PPA based on its traditional regulatory 
criteria requiring it “ensure that retail consumers receive adequate and 
reliable service at reasonable rates, consistent with the financial 
requirements of public utilities and their need to build generating facilities” 
or otherwise secure adequate energy supplies.183  The PUC could approve 
the PPA only if it met the traditional public interest criteria, which required 
it to protect ratepayers from the operational and financial risks of the 
project and to ensure the PPA would ensure Xcel’s financial health.184 
 The Minnesota PUC first concluded that the PPA exposed Xcel and 
its ratepayers to unreasonably high prices and rates.185  Rather than setting 
fixed prices for power purchased from the Mesaba Project, the PPA 
proposed to tie Xcel’s power prices to the costs of building and operating 
the Mesaba Project, including any costs associated with installing carbon 
capture and sequestration technology.186  The Commission determined that 
the Mesaba Project’s costs, excluding carbon capture and sequestration, 
would be around $1.9 billion187 – 30 percent higher than other proposed 
new coal plants.188  Adding carbon capture and sequestration would 
increase the costs by more than one billion dollars and reduce the plant’s 
efficiency by about ten percent.189  Based on these projections, and the lack 
of any cap on the ultimate costs Xcel might pay, the Minnesota PUC found 
the proposed PPA inconsistent with the public interest because it “would 
result in unreasonably high prices for Xcel and unreasonably high rates for 
 
 180. Id. at 6. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 4, 13-23. 
 183. Id. at 13-14 (citing Minn. Stat. § 216B.01 (2003)). 
 184. Id. at 14. 
 185. Id. at 15. 
 186. Id. at 15. 
 187. Id. at 20. 
 188. Id. at 15-16. 
 189. Id. at 15. 
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Xcel’s ratepayers.”190  The PUC did not rule out the possibility that 
Excelsior and Xcel could negotiate a contract setting reasonable rates,191 
but the costs of CCS technology make successful negotiations unlikely. 
 Although costs associated with the Mesaba Project served as the 
main reason for the Minnesota PUC’s rejection of the PPA, the PUC also 
found that the PPA exposed Xcel and its customers to unreasonable 
operational and financial risks.  The PPA would have required Excelsior to 
pay for more than $75 million worth of replacement power if the Mesaba 
Project were to experience breakdowns, shutdowns, or other operational 
problems.192  Seventy-five million dollars would cover only about one 
year’s expense for replacement power, while the PPA would extend for 25 
years.193  The Minnesota PUC concluded that this provision had the effect 
of shifting “nearly all the risk” of breakdown and shutdown onto the 
ratepayers, and thus found the term to be contrary to the public’s interest.194  
The PUC also rejected as unreasonable the PPA’s proposal to place all of 
the financial risks associated with engineering, contracting, and 
constructing the Mesaba Project on Xcel and its ratepayers.195 
 Ultimately, the Minnesota PUC ordered Excelsior and Xcel to 
resume negotiations to see if they could reach agreement regarding the 
terms of a PPA.196  It is unclear, however, if these negotiations will resolve 
the significant disputes at issue in the petition proceedings.  The disputes 
revolved around who should bear the risks for potential cost increases and 
operational failures associated with installing new technology.  Excelsior 
appeared unwilling to expose itself to these risks, and it sought to use the 
PPA to push the risks onto the regulated utility, Xcel.  The Minnesota PUC, 
however, made clear that Xcel and its ratepayers would not bear the risks 
of the expensive and unproven IGCC technology.  With $1.9 billion – at a 
minimum – at stake, it may be the case that neither Excelsior nor Xcel has 
the stomach to assume the risks of new coal technology. 
VI. COAL PLANT DENIALS AND THE RISE OF RENEWABLES? 
 Regulators’ reluctance to permit new coal plants suggests that coal 
may not retain its status as the dominant source of electricity for much 
longer.  The uncertainty surrounding the passage and contents of national 
climate change legislation197 increases the risk that ratepayers could end up 
 
 190. Id. at 17. 
 191. Id. at 17, 23. 
 192. Id. at 17. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 24. 
 197. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Climate Change Bill May Drift:  A Wary Senate Might Not 
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paying for carbon costs if PUCs approve new coal plants.  To avoid this 
risk, PUCs have approached new coal plants with great caution, likely in an 
effort to avoid repeating the mistakes associated with the rise and fall of the 
nuclear power industry.  Indeed, the mishaps with the nuclear energy 
industry continue to resonate today, since many ratepayers continue to pay 
for canceled or abandoned nuclear power plants from which they never 
received any electricity.198  So long as carbon costs remain uncertain199 and 
CCS technologies remain unproven, it is likely that PUCs will continue to 
treat new coal plant proposals with skepticism.  Since it is very likely that 
uncertainties regarding climate change mitigation will perpetuate for the 
foreseeable future, new coal proposals will face more denials.200 
 As PUCs reject more new coal plant proposals, the question that 
arises is:  what new energy sources will come online?  Three major 
 
Decide Measure’s Fate Until Next Year, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 26, 2009, at Business 1 
(recognizing that a new climate change law may take longer to pass than previously 
expected due to other domestic issues taking priority). 
 198. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Nuclear Nonsense:  Why 
Nuclear Power is no Answer to Climate Change and the World’s Post-Kyoto Energy 
Challenges, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 27 (2008) (noting the energy 
consumers in the Pacific Northwest continue to pay for canceled nuclear plants). 
 199. Costs of carbon dioxide will be difficult to predict even if Congress passes national 
climate change legislation.  For example, cost estimates of the recently passed House bill, 
the American Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454), vary widely depending upon 
how regulated entities will respond to certain incentives in the bill.  The bill would, if 
enacted, establish a cap-and-trade system that sets caps on the total allowable emissions and 
lowers that cap over time, distribute emissions allowances to facilities covered under the 
cap, and allow companies to trade emissions allowances in an effort to meet their emissions 
requirements.  CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 2454, AMERICAN 
CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 4-5 (2009).  It would initially distribute more 
than 70 percent of the emissions allowances for free, but by 2031, it would require regulated 
entities to purchase, through an auction, about 70 percent of available allowances.  Id. at 6.  
It would also allow covered entities to use “offsets,” or credits produced through emissions 
reductions of uncovered entities, in lieu of up to two billion GHG allowances each year.  Id. 
at 16. 
The Congressional Budget Office prepared an economic analysis of the bill, in which it 
estimated that the cap-and-trade requirement “would amount to tens of billions of dollars 
annually for private-sector entities and about $1 billion annually for public entities.”  Id. at 
35.  Yet, it also repeatedly noted that it could not provide a cost estimate for various 
requirements under the proposed bill.  Id. at 36-37.  Since the actual costs will depend, 
among other things, on the number of offsets covered entities use and the degree to which 
covered entities can reduce their own emissions, cost estimates will necessarily remain 
speculative.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF H.R. 
2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at vii (2009) (“While the 
ceiling on offset use is clear, their actual use is an open question.”). 
 200. See Cassandra Sweet, Otter Tail Unit Scraps Plans for South Dakota Coal Plant, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090911-712041.html 
(reporting that a Minnesota utility recently withdrew from its sponsorship of a South Dakota 
coal plant due to concerns about finances and uncertainty regarding climate change 
legislation). 
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categories of sources could serve as likely substitutes:  natural gas, nuclear 
energy, and renewable sources including hydropower, wind, solar, and 
wave. 
 In the short term, it seems likely that natural gas will serve as a good 
“bridge” fuel as the electricity sector adjusts to the decline of coal.201  
Natural gas plants are relatively inexpensive to build, and they can turn on 
and off quickly to respond to peak energy needs.202  In addition, natural gas 
power plants emit about one-half of the carbon dioxide that coal plants emit 
and will therefore serve as an acceptable transitional energy source in a 
carbon-constrained world.203  However, as mentioned above, natural gas 
prices are extremely volatile and will likely become even more volatile as 
more countries increase their use of natural gas.204  Therefore, while natural 
gas will ease the transition away from traditional coal, it will likely not 
become a dominant energy source for the future. 
 The fate of nuclear energy remains unclear.  Despite claims of a 
nuclear renaissance and efforts of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to develop more incentives for nuclear power, nuclear 
plant construction costs remain prohibitively high.205  As Professor Tomain 
has argued, nuclear energy seems unlikely to ever be competitive on its 
own, and it will require continued subsidies, liability waivers, and tax 
breaks for it to gain more market share within the electricity sector.206  
Even if Congress continues to support the nuclear industry with these 
incentives – as it seems likely to do – the nuclear industry will still need to 
address other unresolved problems, including the public perception that 
nuclear energy is unsafe and uncertainty about waste disposal.207  Even 
then, utilities seeking to build new plants will need to convince PUCs to 
authorize the construction.  After the experience with nuclear plants in the 
1970s and 1980s, and the de facto moratorium on new plant development 
since 1979, utilities may have a difficult time making the case for more 
 
 201. PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22; see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2009, 72 (2009) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009], available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf (showing that the amount of coal-fired 
plants to be added between 2009 and 2025 will continue to decrease each year). 
 202. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 72. 
 203. PODESTA & WIRTH, supra note 22, at 1. 
 204. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 72 (noting that high oil prices 
may lead to fewer natural gas plants due to price increases); see also supra note 23 and 
accompanying text (describing the positive correlation between natural gas and oil prices 
and indicating the volatility of the price of both fuels). 
 205. See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 198, at 28-29 (providing estimates that nuclear 
plants will cost between $8 billion and $14 billion each to construct); ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 73 (noting that new nuclear plants will not be economical 
during a period of low economic growth). 
 206. Tomain, supra note 70, at 238-43. 
 207. Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 198, at 35-38. 
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nuclear facilities.208 
 This leaves renewable energy sources, which have their own flaws 
but also great potential.  Indeed, if PUCs continue to reject new coal plants 
and resist new nuclear facilities, a window of opportunity could open for 
renewable energy sources to finally enable them to compete on a fairer 
level with coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy. 
 Thus far, most utilities have either sought to employ relatively 
discrete policies, such as net metering laws,209 to incentivize limited, small-
scale construction of renewable energy sources by private land owners or to 
build their own larger base load plants in relatively remote areas of the 
country.210  The first strategy, promotion of small-scale distributed 
generation, is good but has limited potential because it relies on home and 
building owners to purchase and install their own renewable energy 
systems.211  The second strategy similarly has promise, but licensing 
procedures and efforts to connect remote wind and solar farms to the 
interstate transmission grid are time-consuming and costly.212  In addition, 
large solar installations have been proposed in sensitive desert habitats,213 
and it will likely take a considerable period of time for these large arrays to 
 
 208. See Progress Energy Takes Turn Before the PSC, THE JACKSONVILLE OBSERVER, 
Sept. 23, 2009,  http://www.jaxobserver.com/2009/09/23/progress-energy-takes-turn-before-
the-psc/ (describing the likely hurdles a Florida utility will face in order to receive a $500 
million rate increase necessary to fund investment in a proposed nuclear power plant). 
 209. Net metering laws repay consumers for any electricity they produce from their own, 
usually small-scale, renewable energy sources.  See Steven Ferrey, Power Paradox:  The 
Algorithm of Carbon and International Development, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 510, 540 
(2008) (describing how under net metering systems, customers exchange power they 
produce and sell with power that they take from the utility). 
 210. See Joseph Romm, Biggest CA Utility Contracts for World’s Biggest Solar Deal – 
1300 MW Solar Thermal, ClimateProgress.org, Feb. 11, 2009, 
http://climateprogress.org/2009/02/11/southern-california-edison-sce-brightsource-biggest-
csp-concentrated-solar-thermal-power/ (examining a new solar power contract between 
Southern California Edison and BrightSource Energy, Inc., which will create new solar 
power plants totaling 1,300 megawatts of concentrated solar-thermal power). 
 211. See Craig Morris & Nathan Hopkins, Home-Grown Juice, WORLD WATCH, May-
June 2008, at 20, 23-24 (arguing that feed-in-tariffs, which guarantee small-scale energy 
producers a rate of return above the cost of energy production, would better serve the 
renewable energy market). 
 212. See Kelsey Jae Nunez, Gridlock on the Road to Renewable Energy Development:  A 
Discussion about the Opportunities & Risks Presented by the Modernization Requirements 
of the Electricity Transmission Network, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 137 (2007) 
(recognizing that while the United States strongly needs to develop more sources of 
renewable and clean energy, it will be very costly and that utilities, taxpayers who are 
energy-users, and power generators all need to bear the costs of the upgrade). 
 213. See Colin Sullivan, RFK Jr., Enviros Clash Over Mojave Solar Proposal, NY 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/09/08/08greenwire-rfk-jr-
enviros-clash-over-mojave-solar-proposa-98645.html (examining a dispute in California 
over the proposed building of large solar-thermal power plants in the Mojave Desert). 
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come on line, if they ever do.214  Finally, subsidies awarded to the fossil 
fuel industries outnumber subsidies to the renewable energy sector by 
orders of magnitude.215  This disparity has delayed some technological 
improvements in the renewable energy sector and kept it from gaining a 
more significant market share.216 
 However, a decline in coal may open new opportunities for the 
renewable energy sector and create new incentives for regulated utilities to 
invest in renewable energy.  The traditional electricity regulatory model 
already provides some of these incentives, since it allows utilities to profit 
from their capital investments.217  If utilities know that they will no longer 
receive approval for new coal plants, they may seek to increase their profits 
by turning to renewable energy sources.  And unlike the case with nuclear 
plants, construction costs for most renewable energy sources are 
comparatively low and thus not likely to face the same opposition as 
nuclear energy.218  The traditional electricity regulatory model could also 
spur utilities to build their own forms of distributed generation and recover 
the costs of construction and installation in their rate base.  For example, in 
urban areas, instead of encouraging ratepayers to install privately owned 
photovoltaic cells on their roofs, utilities could perform the installation and 
retain ownership of the solar array, while providing the ratepayer a 
discounted electricity rate in exchange for allowing the utility to site the 
solar array on the ratepayer’s roof.219  If the utility could recover expenses 
 
 214. See Bureau of Land Management, BLM Initiates Environmental Analysis of Solar 
Energy Development (May 29, 2008, updated June 12, 2008), 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2008/may_08/NR_053008.html (announcing a 
process for developing an Environmental Impact Statement for 125 proposals to build solar 
energy on public lands). 
 215. See Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience with Energy-Based Tax 
Incentives:  The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 43 (2006) (acknowledging that while over the past 30 years Congress has enacted 
subsidies through tax incentives to encourage the development of renewable energy, 
historically the fossil fuel industry has been the only recipient of these incentives). 
 216. Id. at 74-75. 
 217. See supra notes 50 to 53 and accompanying text. 
 218. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, supra note 201, at 74-75.  Indeed, the Energy 
Information Administration predicts growth in the renewable energy industry even if 
construction costs remain high.  Id. at 75. 
 219. Companies in the United States already rent solar arrays to homeowners in various 
states.  Alano Herro, U.S. Homeowners Can Now “Rent” Solar Panels, Saving Money, 
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/4828.  The 
companies can take advantage of net metering laws and thus earn money both through rental 
income and any repayment the customer would receive under the net metering laws.  
Utilities arguably lose out under these net metering and rental agreements, because they 
cannot profit from the solar investment.  See Posting of Jennifer Kho, Rooftop Solar Setback 
in California, to Green Inc., Energy, the Environment and the Bottom Line,  NY Times.com, 
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/rooftop-solar-setback-in-california/ (Sept. 18, 
2009, 09:17) (discussing utility company opposition to net metering of homeowner solar 
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associated with the installation and construction of the infrastructure 
necessary to implement the distributed generation system, it would have 
ample incentives to revolutionize the electricity system.  Because the 
technology to develop distributed generation already exists,220 utilities 
could undertake the process almost immediately.  As electricity storage and 
other renewable energy generation technologies improve, the utility could 
make upgrades to its system where necessary.  In the near term, distributed 
generation and energy conservation efforts could supply adequate 
electricity to replace any lost electricity from rejected coal plants.221  In the 
more distant future, as renewable energy technologies advance, renewable 
energy sources could begin to replace existing coal plants and augur a 
transition to a clean energy economy.222 
 While these ideas may seem overly optimistic, there is little reason 
why they cannot become reality.223  For the past seventy or so years, the 
abundance, reliability, and, above all, cheapness of coal has allowed it to 
dominate over all other electricity sources.  Now that PUCs have begun to 
reject the idea that coal is cheap, it may well be time for renewable energy 
sources to dominate the electricity sector. 
 
power).  However, if utilities owned the solar arrays, they could arguably recover the cost of 
purchasing the solar arrays in their rate base while incentivizing installation of the panels 
through net metering laws or other incentives. 
 220. See Herro, supra note 219 (discussing solar arrays); see also Sovacool & Cooper, 
supra note 198, at 103-04 (discussing available technologies). 
 221. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:  Restraining 
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scale renewable energy projects.  While these policy questions merit much more review, it is 
nonetheless fair to say that distributed generation provides many opportunities for utilities to 
transition away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy sources. 
